Some good and intelligent readers bring up some salient points about World War II and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.
Almost all older Japanese people know the following but they just shrug their shoulders and say, "The winner's write the textbooks."
It seems that the important point that is being discussed is, in a nutshell, did FDR push Japan into war and/or did the USA commit any acts of war against Japan prior to Dec. 7, 1941?
There were
8 plans to goad Japan into war. They were definitively laid out in the infamous McCollum Memo. Read about those here.
I will write more details on others but, for now, I have found one smoking gun here from
Duane Schultz’s The Maverick War.
It reads:
"....a covert operation against a country with which we had peaceful diplomatic relations. The bombing missions were to be carried out by American mercenaries, men released from the army and navy and paid by the United States government through a private corporation. They were to fly American planes painted with Chinese insignia. What made the plan all the more bizarre was that the highest officials in the government, including President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, approved of it. On July 23, 1941, some five months before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt formally authorized the strikes. They were to begin the following November."
Schultz is writing about the famed Flying Tigers. See
Wikipedia here. It is absurd to think that, if these sorts of shenanigans were going on, that the US government could claim innocence. Consider the history of the USA; when could our federal government ever claim innocence in international skullduggery from the Spanish American war to Iraq and Afghanistan?
To think otherwise is just plain foolish.
Has it never occurred to you as strange why
Chinese forces would be flying USA P-40 Curtiss fighters with caucasian pilots
as early as spring 1941?
There's even a
Hollywood Screenplay about this that could be made into a movie:
The Preemptive Strike screenplay is based on the life experiences of General Claire Lee Chennault and his involvement in organizing "a guerilla air corps" known today as the American Volunteer Group or Flying Tigers. Contrary to popular culture, the AVG was to be more than a fighter group to defend China from the onslaught of Japanese invaders during the Sino-Japanese War which began on July 7, 1937. Chennault intended to bomb Japan with bombers that would be operated from Chekiang Province in southeastern China, only 700 miles from the Japanese home islands. Chennault's audacious plan became officially endorsed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt who signed Joint Army/Navy Board 355 ("the Joint Board Plan") on July 23, 1941, only two days before America imposed a total trade embargo on Japan. The Preemptive Strike story underscores Chennault's struggle to organize his guerilla air corps in the jungles of Burma (a British colony) and the frustrations he experienced when the bombers promised by FDR failed to arrive by early November, as scheduled in the Joint Board Plan.
There actually is documentation of these USA pilots flying missions for China in a sneak attack on Japan:
In December 1940, General George C. Marshall had managed to talk the administration out of this sneak attack on Japan on the grounds that the United States didn’t have the planes or crews to spare, and for fear that it "would provoke a Japanese counterattack on the United States at a time when we were woefully unprepared to go to war." But the plan was resurrected in the spring of 1941, and the raids would have been carried out in November of that year had not production and shipping bottlenecks delayed the arrival of Chennault’s bombers. On November 22, FDR’s special envoy to China informed him that he hoped that the bombers (twin-engine Lockheed Hudsons rather than the four-engine Boeing B-17s that Chennault had wanted) and their flight and ground crews would reach that country by the end of 1941, and 49 ground crewmen were at sea on their way there on December 7.
Lawrence Vance writes it best and I will quote his article at length:
There have been a slew of books written over the years on the subject of Roosevelt's duplicity and culpability regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I believe the most recent one is George Victor's The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Potomac Books, 2007). This is an exceptional book, not only because it is up-to-date and very well documented, but also because the author is an "admirer of Roosevelt" who maintains that "criticism and justification of Roosevelt's acts are outside the purpose of this book."
But before World War II had even ended, Roosevelt's nemesis John T. Flynn (1882—1964) wrote what is probably the first "revisionist" account of the Pearl Harbor attack: The Truth About Pearl Harbor. This appeared on the front page of the Chicago Daily Tribune on October 22, 1944, "with only a few deletions," under the headline of: "Records Bear Truth about Pearl Harbor." Flynn wrote a sequel in 1945 that was published in the same paper on September 2, 1945, under the three headlines of: Exposes More Secrets of Pearl Harbor Scandal
Blame for Tragic Delays Fixed; Blunders Bared
John T. Flynn Charges Government Knew Jap Cabinet Intended to Break Relations
The editor's note preceding the article reads:
John T. Flynn, investigator and publicist, author of "The Truth About Pearl Harbor," has written a second sensational article on this catastrophe. He discloses new and startling information that was in the possession of the United States high command during the final days and hours before the great Pacific base was attacked by the Japanese on Dec. 7, 1941. In this inclusive treatise, he fixes the blame for the disaster squarely upon Franklin D. Roosevelt, then President of the United States.
This was published in booklet form as The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. At the end of his essay in this latter work, Flynn summed up what he saw as the "pathetic tragedy of blunders":By January l, 1941, Roosevelt had decided to go to war with Japan.
But he had solemnly pledged the people he would not take their sons to foreign wars unless attacked. Hence he dared not attack and so decided to provoke the Japanese to do so.
He kept all this a secret from the Army and Navy.
He felt the moment to provoke the attack had come by November. He ended negotiations abruptly November 26 by handing the Japanese an ultimatum which he knew they dared not comply with.
Immediately he knew his ruse would succeed, that the Japanese looked upon relations as ended and were preparing for the assault. He knew this from the intercepted messages.
He was certain the attack would be against British territory, at Singapore perhaps, and perhaps on the Philippines or Guam. If on the Philippines or Guam he would have his desired attack. But if only British territory were attacked could he safely start shooting? He decided he could and committed himself to the British government. But he never revealed this to his naval chief.
He did not order Short to change his alert and he did not order Kimmel to take his fleet out of Pearl Harbor, out where it could defend itself, because he wanted to create the appearance of being completely at peace and surprised when the Japs started shooting. Hence he ordered Kimmel and Short not to do anything to cause alarm or suspicion. He was completely sure the Japs would not strike at Pearl Harbor.
Thus he completely miscalculated. He disregarded the advice of men who always held that Pearl Harbor would be first attacked. He disregarded the warning implicit in the hour chosen for attack and called to Knox's attention. He disregarded the advice of his chiefs that we were unprepared.
When the attack came he was appalled and frightened. He dared not give the facts to the country. To save himself he maneuvered to lay the blame upon Kimmel and Short. To prevent them from proving their innocence he refused them a trial. When the case was investigated by two naval and army boards, he suppressed the reports. He threatened prosecution to any man who would tell the truth.
[Kimmel and Short were the Pearl Harbor Navy and Army commanders; Knox was the Secretary of the Navy.]
Flynn's works on Pearl Harbor were followed by George Morgenstern's Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War (New York: Devin-Adair, 1947) and Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald's The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor: The Washington Contribution to the Japanese Attack (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954). In addition, the following books were also published about the same time that contain valuable chapters relating to Pearl Harbor and/or U.S. foreign policy in relation to Japan in the 1930s: Charles A. Beard's President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (Yale University Press, 1948), William Henry Chamberlin's America's Second Crusade (Henry Regnery, 1950), Charles Callan Tansill's Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933—1941 (Henry Regnery, 1952), and the edited work by Harry Elmer Barnes, with contributions by Morgenstern, Chamberlin, Tansill, et al., titled Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath (The Caxton Printers, 1953).
Nevertheless, the myth of Pearl Harbor was soon well established. Barnes lamented in 1966:
Despite this voluminous revisionist literature which has appeared since 1945 and its sensational content, there is still virtually no public knowledge of revisionist facts over twenty years after V-J Day. The "man on the street" is just as prone to accept Roosevelt's "day of infamy" legend today as he was on December 8, 1941.
He gives several reasons why this is the case: the country never really had time to cool off after the war like it did following World War I, the American public proved more susceptible to simple brainwashing through propaganda than Orwell could imagine, the conformity of intellectuals whereby individuality and independence all but disappeared, the moderation of the liberals and radicals who had been champions of revisionism after the First World War, the intense hatred of Hitler and Mussolini that blinds people to accept any facts that might diminish their guilt, the rise of the idea that the United States must do battle with any foreign country whose political ideology does not accord with ours, the excessive security measures adopted under the Cold War that have increased the public's fear and timidity, and the lack of major publishers willing to publish revisionist material.
This latter point is especially important because, says Barnes: "No matter how many revisionist books are produced, how high their quality, or how sensational their revelations, they will have no effect on the American public until this public learns of the existence, nature, and importance of revisionist literature."
The last sentence is what is operative here:
"No matter how many revisionist books are produced, how high their quality, or how sensational their revelations, they will have no effect on the American public until this public learns of the existence, nature, and importance of revisionist literature."
It is just too difficult for most Americans to lose the brainwashing that "We are the good guys" that we were taught in school.
